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Abstract:  Analysing cooperative provision of a global public good such as climate protection, we 
explore the relationship between equitable burden sharing on the one hand and core stability on 
the other hand. To assess the size of the burden which a public good contribution entails for a 
country, we make use of a specific measure based on Moulin (1987). In particular, we show that a 
Pareto-optimal allocation which is not in the core can always be blocked by a group of countries 
with the highest Moulin sacrifices. In this sense, it is the ‘overburdening’ and thus ‘unfair’ treat-
ment of some countries that provides the reason for core instability. By contrast, a Pareto-
optimal allocation is in the core if the public good contributions are fairly equally distributed ac-
cording to their Moulin sacrifices. The potential implications of our theoretical analysis for global 
climate policy are also discussed.  
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1. Introduction 
Achieving Pareto-efficient public good allocations is a challenging task, particularly at the interna-
tional stage. Without a central authority or common institutions which can enforce contributions 
of countries to the funding of international public goods, their efficient provision hinges on main-
taining voluntary cooperation of all countries. Consequently, the stability of coalitions is key to 
successful cooperation on public good provision, with climate protection being one of the most 
prominent examples.1 
 On a basic level, stability means that member countries do not prefer breaking away from a 
coalition. To make this precise, several stability concepts have been suggested in the literature 
(see Finus, 2001, 2008, Ray, 2007, or Eyckmans, 2012, for overviews). One of the most prominent 
is the classical concept of core stability, where a Pareto-optimal allocation is said to lie in the core 
if no sub-coalition of countries is able to improve the welfare of all its members by abandoning 
the original allocation and generating a new standalone allocation.2 Different assumptions can be 
made about the behaviour of the remaining countries after separation of the sub-coalition from 
the whole group of countries, leading to various specifications of the core concept (see, e.g., 
Moulin, 1995, or in the context of international environmental cooperation Finus, 2001, pp. 245-
254).   
 The core concept, however, is not only important for the stability of international agreements 
on global public good provision but also for the determination of the possible outcomes of inter-
national negotiations over global public good provision. As bargaining outcomes require unani-
mous approval of all signatories, any allocation outside the core will be rejected by at least some 
group of countries. These blocking countries can increase their welfare by forming a sub-coalition 
and signing an alternative agreement with only limited participation. On the one hand, an effi-
cient provision of the public good thus can only be expected as the bargaining outcome of a 
grand coalition if the resulting allocation lies in the core. On the other hand, a bargaining out-
come will only be accepted by the parties if it satisfies certain criteria of distributional justice 
(see, e.g., Ringius, Torvanger and Underdal, 2002, Lange, Vogt and Ziegler, 2007, Posner and 
                                                 
1
 The prospect of international cooperation on environmental issues and the stability of cooperation also depend, to 
some degree, on the environmental policy instruments that are applied. See, e.g., Endres and Finus (1999) who ana-
lyse how the instrument choice affects the success of international environmental agreements. This aspect will, 
however, not be considered further in this paper. 
2
 The seminal application of the core concept to public good economies is Foley (1970). For treatments of the core in 
general public good economies, see also Myles (1995) and Cornes and Sandler (1996). Chander and Tulkens (1995, 
1997, 2009), Finus und Rundshagen (2006) and Wiesmeth (2012, pp. 108-117) apply the core concept more specifi-
cally to international environmental externalities and international public goods.  
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Weisbach, 2010, and IPCC, 2014). So notions of equity and fair burden sharing are constant topics 
in negotiations about global climate change policy.  
 Against this background the objective of this paper is to analyse the relationship between eq-
uitable burden sharing and core stability. To this end, we focus on a specific interpretation of 
equity, based on Moulin’s (1987) famous egalitarian-equivalence concept. We make use of the 
Moulin sacrifices to measure the burden which a public good contribution entails for a country, 
given its income and preferences. Taking these determinants of a country’s burden into account 
also shows that burden sharing according to Moulin sacrifices is closely related to both the abil-
ity-to-pay principle and the benefit principle (see Buchholz and Peters, 2008). For a long time, 
both principles have played an important role in the theory of equitable public good provision 
(see already Wicksell, 1896, and Lindahl, 1919) and are meanwhile also taken as relevant for dis-
tributional issues in global climate policy (see, e.g., Sandler, 2004, and Pearson, 2011). 
 More specifically, we show that if a Pareto-optimal allocation is not in the core, it can be 
blocked by a group of countries with the highest Moulin sacrifices. In this sense, it is the ‘over-
burdening’ and thus somewhat ‘unfair’ treatment of some countries that provides the reason for 
core instability. By contrast, a Pareto-efficient allocation is in the core if the public good contribu-
tions are fairly equally distributed across countries according to their Moulin sacrifices. The impli-
cations of these results for international cooperation over public goods are straightforward: An 
equitable burden-sharing arrangement based on Moulin sacrifices can pave the way for the for-
mation of a stable grand coalition which agrees on a Pareto-efficient allocation. In this sense, 
efficiency and equity issues are clearly linked. 
 Moulin’s (1987, p. 964) seminal work maintains that the core may serve as “a meaningful 
guideline in the search for equitable cost sharing”, since it “means that no coalition should be 
charged more than its ‘stand alone’ cost.” But the explanation of this issue remains rather curso-
ry and no explicit reference to equity criteria is made. In our paper, we clarify the relationship 
between the concepts of core stability, efficiency and equity, thus shedding some new light on 
Moulin´s egalitarian-equivalent approach. 
 Our analysis provides an alternative to the link between equity and core stability suggested by 
Mas-Colell and Silvestre (1989) and Weber and Wiesmeth (1991). In the vein of Foley (1970), they 
show that the core of a public good economy is equivalent to the set of ‘cost-share equilibria’ in 
which utility-maximising agents―similarly as in the Lindahl model―voluntarily accept a Pareto-
optimal allocation when personalised cost-share functions (as a generalisation of the Lindahl 
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prices) are given. In a certain sense, these cost share equilibria lead to a balanced distribution of 
the costs of public good supply. This approach, however, is different from ours, since our analysis 
is explicitly based on a specific equity norm.3 
 In most other papers on stability and coalition formation in an environmental context (see, 
e.g., Carraro and Siniscalo, 1993, Barrett, 1994, and Finus, 2001), it is assumed that the coalition 
members maximise the aggregate welfare of the coalition. Distributional issues within the coali-
tion are mostly ignored, particularly as countries are usually assumed to be identical in every re-
spect. Moreover, these papers apply very different stability concepts and―when analysing ‘in-
ternal stability’―focus on the incentives for individual countries to leave a coalition. By contrast, 
we examine what type of contribution scheme is actually consistent with a stable grand coalition 
when countries are heterogeneous in preferences and income and can leave the grand coalition 
as a group (where this grand coalition can stand for an international environmental agreement 
between all countries). 
 We proceed as follows: Section 2 presents our framework and some preliminary considera-
tions. In Section 3, we analyse the relationship between the core property of an efficient alloca-
tion and the distribution of Moulin sacrifices across countries. A simple example illustrates the 
general results and highlights some potential implications of our analysis in Section 4.  In Section 
5, we discuss the political relevance of our findings and the implications of an alternative techno-
logical assumption. Section 6 summarises this paper and concludes with some final remarks. 
 
2. A Public-Good Economy and the Moulin Sacrifice 
2.1 The Framework 
We consider a public good economy consisting of 𝑛 ≥ 2 countries (see Bergstrom, Blume and 
Varian, 1986, and Cornes and Sandler, 1996, as classical references). Each country 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁 =
{1, … , 𝑛} is endowed with 𝑦𝑖 units of a private numeraire good. We denote private consumption 
in country 𝑖 by 𝑥𝑖  and the level of public good supply by 𝐺. Preferences of any country 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁 are 
given by its utility function 𝑢𝑖(𝑥𝑖, 𝐺), which is assumed to be defined for all (𝑥𝑖, 𝐺) with 𝑥𝑖 ≥ 0 
and 𝐺 ≥ 0 and to have the standard properties; i.e. it is twice continuously differentiable, strictly 
monotone increasing in both arguments, and strictly quasi-concave. Furthermore, we suppose 
                                                 
3
 In a framework with transferable utility and based on different normative criteria, LeBreton et al. (2013) also consid-
er the relationship between core stability (“secession proofness”) and fairness. See also Allouch (2010) for a further 
characterisation of core allocations in the presence of warm glow effects. 
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that indifference curves do not intersect the 𝑥𝑖-axis. This additional assumption facilitates the 
exposition in the general case, and is also fulfilled by the Cobb-Douglas utility function, which we 
will use in our illustrative example later on. 
 The following assumption characterises how units of the private numeraire good can be trans-
formed into units of the public good. 
 
Technological Assumption T1: The costs of providing some amount of the public good 𝐺 ≥ 0  are 
given by the cost function 𝐶(𝐺), which is twice differentiable and has 𝐶(0) = 0, 𝐶′(𝐺) > 0, and 
𝐶′′(𝐺) ≥ 0.  
 
Under assumption T1, an allocation 𝐴 = ((𝑥𝑖
𝐴)𝑖∈𝑁 , 𝐺
𝐴) is feasible if 𝐶(𝐺𝐴) ≤ ∑ 𝑧𝑖
𝐴𝑛
𝑖=1 , where 
𝑧𝑖
𝐴 = 𝑦𝑖 − 𝑥𝑖
𝐴 denote country 𝑖’s expenses for the public good. If resources are not wasted so 
that the constraint is binding, this feasibility condition becomes 𝐶(𝐺𝐴) + ∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝐴𝑛
𝑖=1 = 𝑌 ≔ ∑ 𝑦𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 . 
In the same vein, we say that some group of countries 𝐾 ⊆ 𝑁 can produce a standalone alloca-
tion 𝐴 = ((𝑥𝑖
𝐴(𝐾)
)𝑖∈𝐾 , 𝐺
𝐴(𝐾))  in which no outsider is contributing to the public good if 
𝐶(𝐺𝐴(𝐾)) ≤ ∑ 𝑧𝑖
𝐴(𝐾)
𝑖∈𝐾   holds and thus the condition 
 
(1)                    𝐶(𝐺𝐴(𝐾)) + ∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝐴(𝐾)
𝑖∈𝐾
= 𝑌𝐾 ≔ ∑ 𝑦𝑖
𝑖∈𝐾
. 
                                 
is satisfied. Condition (1) trivially includes the cases in which  is a singleton or  comprises all 
countries as the ‘grand coalition’, simply by letting 𝑌𝐾 = 𝑦𝑖  or 𝑌𝐾 = 𝑌. This feasibility condition 
allows for 𝑧𝑖
𝐴 < 0, or  equivalently 𝑥𝑖
𝐴(𝐾)
> 𝑦𝑖, to hold for some country 𝑖 ∈ 𝐾, which means that 
in allocation 𝐴(𝐾) country 𝑖 receives a transfer of the numeraire good from the other countries.            
 If, as it is fairly standard in the theory of public goods, the cost function 𝐶(𝐺) is linear so that, 
without loss of generality, 𝐶(𝐺) = 𝐺 can be assumed, condition (1) boils down to 𝐺𝐴(𝐾) +
∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝐴(𝐾)
𝑖∈𝐾 = 𝑌. 
 The feasible allocations can be completely represented by their levels of private consumption, 
i.e. by (𝑥𝑖
𝐴(𝐾)
)𝑖∈𝐾, since the public good level 𝐺
𝐴(𝐾) is then implicitly defined by the feasibility 
constraint. This representation will be used in the following. 
K K
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 While our main results will be based on T1, we will argue in Section 5.2 that our key messages 
remain intact under a more general technology assumption, allowing for country-specific public 
production functions. 
 
2.2 Some Preliminary Considerations 
As a starting point, we consider feasible allocations 𝐴 = 𝐴(𝑁) = (𝑥𝑖
𝐴)𝑖∈𝑁 which are also Pareto-
optimal and can thus be thought as the outcome of full cooperation between all 𝑛 countries. An 
allocation 𝐴 is Pareto-optimal if there is no other feasible allocation which gives all countries 
𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛 at least the utility level 𝑢𝑖
𝐴 = 𝑢𝑖(𝑥𝑖
𝐴, 𝐺𝐴) and at least one country 𝑗 a utility level ex-
ceeding 𝑢𝑖
𝐴. As usual, these Pareto-optimal allocations can be characterised by the Samuelson 
condition, which in our framework reads ∑ 𝑚𝑟𝑠𝑖(𝑥𝑖
𝐴, 𝐺𝐴) = 𝐶′(𝐺𝐴)𝑛𝑖=1 , where 𝑚𝑟𝑠𝑖(𝑥𝑖
𝐴, 𝐺𝐴) =
𝜕𝑢𝑖 𝜕𝐺⁄
𝜕𝑢𝑖 𝜕𝑥𝑖⁄
(𝑥𝑖
𝐴, 𝐺𝐴) denotes country 𝑖’s marginal rate of substitution between the public and the 
private good at point (𝑥𝑖
𝐴, 𝐺𝐴). For such Pareto-optimal allocations, the following definition 
states the criterion for core stability. 
 
Definition 1: A subgroup of countries, i.e. a coalition 𝐾 ⊂ 𝑁 of 𝑘 < 𝑛 countries, can block a given 
Pareto-optimal allocation 𝐴 if there exists a blocking standalone allocation 𝐵(𝐾) = (𝑥𝑖
𝐵(𝐾))𝑖∈𝐾 
which is feasible for coalition 𝐾 and satisfies 
 
(2)                    𝑢𝑖
𝐵(𝐾) = 𝑢𝑖(𝑥𝑖
𝐵(𝐾), 𝐺𝐵(𝐾)) > 𝑢𝑖
𝐴 
 
for all countries 𝑖 ∈ 𝐾. A Pareto-optimal allocation 𝐴 = (𝑥𝑖
𝐴)𝑖∈𝑁 lies in the core if no coalition 
exists that is able to block allocation 𝐴. 
 
 This definition says that a blocking coalition 𝐾 must be able to obtain a strict Pareto-
improvement for its members by abandoning the allocation 𝐴 and providing the public good only 
with its own endowments, i.e. the blocking coalition operates under the assumption that the 
non-members do not make a positive contribution to the public good. We will relate this specific 
core property to other core concepts appearing in the literature in Section 5.1. If an initial alloca-
tion were not Pareto-optimal, the group of all countries, i.e. the grand coalition, could trivially 
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block such an allocation in accordance with Definition 1. To exclude this uninteresting case, the 
definition is restricted to Pareto-optimal allocations. 
 To characterise the core of a public good economy more precisely, and to link the core proper-
ty to concepts of equity, we will make use of the egalitarian-equivalent public good levels as de-
vised by Moulin (1987), which are defined as follows.  
 
Definition 2: Given some feasible (and not necessarily Pareto-optimal) allocation 𝐴 = (𝑥𝑖
𝐴)𝑖∈𝑁  
with public good supply 𝐺𝐴, country 𝑖’s egalitarian-equivalent level of public good supply ?̅?𝑖
𝐴 is 
implicitly defined by the condition 
 
(3)                    𝑢𝑖(𝑦𝑖, ?̅?𝑖
𝐴) = 𝑢𝑖(𝑥𝑖
𝐴, 𝐺𝐴) = 𝑢𝑖
𝐴. 
 
The Moulin sacrifice of country i  is then 
 
(4)                    𝑠𝑖
𝐴 ≔ 𝐺𝐴 − ?̅?𝑖
𝐴. 
 
 The definition of the egalitarian-equivalent public good level means that country 𝑖 is indiffer-
ent between the original allocation 𝐴 and a hypothetical allocation 𝐵 in which it consumes ?̅?𝑖
𝐴 of 
the public good and 𝑦𝑖 of the private good. In this hypothetical allocation, country 𝑖 makes no 
contribution to the public good, converts all of its endowment into private consumption, and 
receives just enough of the public good to obtain the same utility level as in the original alloca-
tion (see Figure 1). Under our assumptions on the utility functions, egalitarian-equivalent public 
good levels exist and are uniquely determined for all countries if public good supply 𝐺𝐴 and all 
private consumption levels 𝑥𝑖
𝐴 are strictly positive. 
 Figure 1 depicts the indifference curve corresponding to the utility level 𝑢𝑖
𝐴, with 𝑥𝑖  on the 
horizontal and 𝐺 on the vertical axis. The function ℎ𝑖
𝐴(𝐺) = ℎ𝑖(𝐺, 𝑢𝑖
𝐴) captures this indifference 
curve as a function of public good supply 𝐺, relating the level of private consumption that coun-
try 𝑖 needs to attain utility 𝑢𝑖
𝐴 with any level of public good provision 𝐺. 
 The Moulin sacrifice of country 𝑖 is a willingness-to-pay measure. It shows that, starting from 
the public good level ?̅?𝑖
𝐴 and zero public good contribution of country 𝑖 (see point 𝐵 in Figure 1), 
country 𝑖 is ready to donate 𝑧𝑖
𝐴 = 𝑦𝑖 − 𝑥𝑖
𝐴 to increase public good supply from ?̅?𝑖
𝐴 to 𝐺𝐴. Con-
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
A
versely, starting from the initial allocation 𝐴 (see point 𝐴 in Figure 1), country 1 is willing to give 
up 𝑠𝑖
𝐴 of its public good consumption to avoid any contribution to the public good and thus to 
raise its private consumption from 𝑥𝑖
𝐴 to 𝑦𝑖. In this sense, the Moulin sacrifice can be interpreted 
as country 𝑖’s burden of contributing to the public good, expressed not in units of the private but 
in units of the public good. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       
 
 
 
 The size of the Moulin sacrifices depends on the level of public good contributions, the coun-
tries’ preferences for the public good and their income levels in the following way (see Buchholz 
and Peters, 2008, for details and the Cobb-Douglas example in Section 4 of this paper as an illus-
tration): 
 If all countries have the same income levels and the same preferences, then their Moulin 
sacrifices in a given allocation are positively correlated with their levels of public good 
contributions.  
 If all countries make the same public good contribution, their Moulin sacrifices in a given 
allocation are negatively correlated with the strength of their preferences for the public 
good and, given normality, with their income levels. In this way, the concept of the Mou-
lin sacrifice reflects both the benefit principle and the ability-to-pay principle: A country’s 
burden of public good provision as measured by its Moulin sacrifice is lower when this 
B
G
AG
A
iG
A
ix iy ix
A
is

 
Figure 1: Egalitarian-equivalent public good supply 
and the Moulin sacrifice 
 A =  Original allocation 
 B =  Egalitarian-equivalent allocation 
0
ℎ𝑖
𝐺(𝐺) 
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country benefits more from the public good (benefit principle) and when it is richer and 
can thus afford to pay more for the public good (ability-to-pay principle).4  
 
 In the following section, the Moulin sacrifice will be used as an equity standard by which the 
core property can be characterised.  
 
3.  Equity and the Stability of Coalitions 
First of all, we provide a basic condition that is necessary and sufficient for the existence of a coa-
lition 𝐾 able to block an allocation 𝐴. 
  
Lemma: Under assumption T1, coalition 𝐾 can block a Pareto-optimal allocation 𝐴 if and only if 
there is some public good level ?̃? < 𝐺𝐴 such that 
 
(5)                    𝑌𝐾
𝐴(?̃?) = ∑ ℎ𝑖
𝐴(?̃?)
𝑖∈𝐾
+ 𝐶(?̃?) < 𝑌𝐾. 
 
Any ?̃? which fulfils condition (5) can be the public good supply in a blocking allocation chosen by 
coalition 𝐾. 
 
Proof: See Appendix A 1. 
 
 Given a Pareto-optimal allocation 𝐴 and a coalition 𝐾, the function 𝑌𝐾
𝐴(𝐺) shows the total in-
come which coalition 𝐾 needs to supply the public good level 𝐺 and, at the same time, to ensure 
that all coalition members attain the same utility level as in allocation 𝐴. If we further define 
?̂?𝐾
𝐴 ≔ min{𝑌𝐾
𝐴(𝐺): 𝐺 > 0}, then condition (5) means that coalition 𝐾 can block allocation 𝐴 if 
and only if the total endowment 𝑌𝐾 of the coalition exceeds the critical level ?̂?𝐾
𝐴
. Thus, in applying 
duality theory (see, e.g., Cornes, 1992), we can provide both a necessary and sufficient criterion 
for the ability of a coalition to block a given allocation. 
 Based on the Lemma, we can now show that, if blocking is possible at all, there always exists a 
specific type of a blocking coalition.     
                                                 
4
 The relationship between willingness-to-pay on the one hand and both the benefit principle and the ability-to-pay 
principle on the other hand is also discussed in a non-technical way by Pearson (2011, pp. 174-175). 
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Proposition 1: Assume that some coalition 𝐾 can block a Pareto-optimal allocation 𝐴 = (𝑥𝑖
𝐴)𝑖∈𝑁,   
i.e. this allocation is not in the core. Then there exists some threshold level ?̆? for the Moulin sacri-
fices such that ?̆? = {𝑖 ∈ 𝑁: 𝑠𝑖
𝐴 ≥ ?̆?} is a blocking coalition too. 
 
Proof: See Appendix A 2. 
 
 The construction underlying the proof of Proposition 1 can be explained as follows. We start 
from some coalition 𝐾 that blocks allocation 𝐴 and provides 𝐺𝐵(𝐾) < 𝐺𝐴 units of the public good. 
Then another blocking coalition 𝐾′ is obtained in two steps. First, we eliminate from the blocking 
coalition all countries 𝑗 ∈ 𝐾 which can attain the utility level 𝑢𝑗
𝐴 only if they receive a positive 
income transfer and thus make a negative contribution to the public good in the original blocking 
allocation with public good supply 𝐺𝐵(𝐾). Second, we add to the blocking coalition all countries 
𝑙 ∈ 𝑁/𝐾 that attain their utility level 𝑢𝑗
𝐴 by making a non-negative contribution to the public 
good supply 𝐺𝐵(𝐾) in the blocking allocation. 
 The positions of an expelled country 𝑗 and a newly included country 𝑙 are visualised in the left 
and the right panel of Figure 2. Given public good supply 𝐺𝐵(𝐾) of the initial blocking coalition 
𝐵(𝐾), the values ℎ𝑗
𝐴(𝐺𝐵(𝐾)) and ℎ𝑙
𝐴(𝐺𝐵(𝐾)) define the private consumption levels through which 
countries 𝑗 and 𝑙 attain 𝑢𝑗
𝐴 and 𝑢𝑙
𝐴, which are the minimum levels needed to make these coun-
tries members of a blocking coalition. In the case of an expelled country 𝑙, the private consump-
tion level ℎ𝑗
𝐴(𝐺𝐵(𝐾)) exceeds its initial endowment 𝑦𝑗, which entails a negative public good con-
tribution by country 𝑗 and a low Moulin sacrifice 𝑠𝑖
𝐴 < ?̆? ≔ 𝐺𝐴 − 𝐺𝐵(𝐾) (see the left panel of Fig-
ure 2). By contrast, in the case of an included country 𝑙, the private consumption level ℎ𝑙
𝐴(𝐺𝐵(𝐾)) 
falls below 𝑦𝑙, such that this country makes a positive public good contribution and has a high 
Moulin sacrifice 𝑠𝑖
𝐴 > ?̆?  (see the right panel of Figure 2). Thus countries with a low Moulin sacri-
fice drop out of the blocking coalition while countries with a high Moulin sacrifice enter the 
blocking coalition. 
 This systematic procedure of shrinking and enlarging the blocking coalition leaves the coun-
tries that have the highest Moulin sacrifices in the original allocation 𝐴 as members of a newly 
formed blocking coalition. 
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 Proposition 1 provides a normatively oriented explanation as to why a group of countries may 
have a reason to deviate from an international agreement (e.g. an international environmental 
agreement) and break up the grand coalition: As measured by their Moulin sacrifices, the mem-
bers of this group are ‘overburdened’ in the original allocation. They make particularly high sacri-
fices for public good provision, thus violating a specific notion of equity. By forming a blocking 
coalition, the originally disadvantaged countries get rid of countries which took a free-ride on the 
‘too high’ public good contribution of the separating countries. 
 As explained at the end of Section 2, the Moulin sacrifice of a country increases with its con-
tribution to the public good and decreases with its income level and its preference intensity for 
the public good. Thus, the natural candidates for a blocking coalition are those countries which 
make a high contribution to the public good in the initial, Pareto-optimal allocation and, at the 
same time, are relatively poor or exhibit weak preferences for the public good. Regarding these 
countries the benefit principle or the ability-to-pay principle is violated. From the viewpoint of 
our analysis, it is the violation of these two principles which explains the incentive to break off 
from a coalition and thus causes the instability of non-core allocations. 
 Referring to the inequality of Moulin sacrifices across countries, Proposition 1 suggests that 
core stability is to be expected if the Moulin sacrifices of the countries are homogenous. To ex-
plore this notion in detail, let 𝐸 = (𝑥𝑖
𝐸)𝑖∈𝑁 denote the Pareto-optimal allocation for which 
𝑠𝑖
𝐸 =: 𝑠𝐸 holds for each 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛, i.e. in which the size of the Moulin sacrifice is the same for 
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each country. Such an equal-Moulin-sacrifice (EMS) solution with public good supply 𝐺𝐸 exists 
and is unique (see Buchholz and Peters, 2008). In the allocation 𝐸, the contributions of countries 
with high income or strong preferences for the public good are high while those of countries with 
low income or weak preferences for the public good are small. We can now prove the following 
result, which shows that any Pareto-optimal allocation whose corresponding Moulin sacrifices lie 
in the neighbourhood of the EMS allocation is in the core. 
 
Proposition 2: Let income levels and preferences of all countries be given. Then there exists some 
𝜀 > 0 so that all Pareto-optimal allocations 𝐴 with Moulin sacrifices 𝑠𝑖
𝐴 ∈ [𝑠𝐸 − 𝜀, 𝑠𝐸 + 𝜀] for all 
𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛 lie in the core. 
 
Proof: See Appendix A 3. 
 
 According to Proposition 2, the grand coalition which agrees on a Pareto-optimal allocation is 
stable if the burden of public good provision―as measured by the Moulin sacrifices―is not too 
unevenly shared across countries. This conclusion not only extends a result in Moulin (1987),5 but 
it also gives the core concept a meaningful interpretation by relating the core concept to a par-
ticular normative criterion of an equitable burden-sharing arrangement which―as discussed 
above―encompasses both the ability-to-pay and the benefit principle. 
 By making an additional assumption on the countries’ preferences, we can establish a con-
verse to Proposition 2, which says that any coalition will be able to block a Pareto-optimal alloca-
tion if the Moulin sacrifices of all coalition members sufficiently differ from the level of the equal 
Moulin sacrifices in allocation 𝐸.  
 
CEP Preferences: The preferences of country 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁 can be represented by a utility function of the 
form 𝑢𝑖(𝑥𝑖 , 𝐺) = 𝜓(𝐺)𝑥𝑖 + 𝜑𝑖(𝐺).  
                                                 
5
 In contrast to Moulin’s (1987) result, Hahn and Gilles (1998) provide an example of an egalitarian-equivalent alloca-
tion that does not lie in the core in a two-agent public good economy. Hahn and Gilles’ (1998) framework, however,  
differs from the standard public good model in several respects. So, as the agents can jointly carry out only one pub-
lic project, they face a discrete and not a continuous choice of public good supply―a fact that Hahn and Gilles (1998) 
identify as the main reason why they reach a conclusion being different from Moulin (1987). More importantly, Hahn 
and Gilles (1998) also assume in their example that joint provision of the public project by the two agents makes one 
agent worse off than in her standalone solution. Without this rather unorthodox assumption, the egalitarian-
equivalent allocation would also be in the core of the Hahn and Gilles’ (1998) example. 
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 For 𝜓(𝐺) = 1, the CEP assumption generalises the case in which all countries have quasi-
linear utility functions by allowing for a country-specific valuation of the public good 𝜑𝑖(𝐺). Fur-
thermore, the CEP assumption is also fulfilled if all countries have the same Cobb-Douglas utility 
function, i.e. if 𝜓(𝐺) = 𝐺𝛼 and 𝜑𝑖(𝐺) = 0. 
       It is well-known from the literature on public goods that public good supply will be the same 
in all Pareto-optimal allocations if and only if the CEP assumption is satisfied (Bergstrom and 
Cornes, 1983). In particular, that means the efficient level of public good provision is independent 
of the distribution of private consumption and thus utility among countries. Given CEP prefer-
ences, we then obtain the following result: 
 
Proposition 3: Assume CEP preferences and let some group of countries 𝐾 ⊂ 𝑁 be given. Then 
there exists a threshold level 𝑠(𝐾) > 𝑠𝐸 for Moulin sacrifices such that coalition 𝐾 can block a 
Pareto-optimal allocation 𝐴 if 𝑠𝑖
𝐴 > 𝑠(𝐾) is satisfied for all 𝑖 ∈ 𝐾.  
 
Proof: See Appendix A 4. 
 
 If the Moulin sacrifices of all members of a potential coalition are sufficiently high in the initial 
allocation (i.e. if the sacrifices exceed the threshold level 𝑠(𝐾)), then this subgroup of countries 
can indeed be better off outside of the ‘grand’ coalition. This result confirms the suggestion that 
asymmetric burden sharing enables subgroups of countries to block Pareto-optimal solutions. 
Conversely, Proposition 2 shows that equitable burden sharing prevents Pareto-optimal alloca-
tions from being blocked. 
 The next Proposition, which holds without invoking the CEP assumption, reinforces this notion 
from a somewhat different position. It shows that, if we start from a setting with heterogeneous 
Moulin sacrifices, equalising the Moulin sacrifices through an income transfer will keep a given 
Pareto-optimal allocation in the core. Thus, redistribution of income which leads to a more equal 
burden sharing can never destabilise cooperative agreements.  
 
Proposition 4: Suppose that some Pareto-optimal allocation 𝐴 is in the core for some initial dis-
tribution of endowments (𝑦1, … , 𝑦𝑛). This allocation will remain in the core if the endowment of 
a country with a high Moulin sacrifice is decreased by some amount and the endowment of an-
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other country with a lower Moulin sacrifice is increased by the same amount without changing 
the ranking of the sacrifice levels. 
 
Proof: See Appendix A 5. 
 
 The intuition behind Proposition 4 is straightforward. For a fixed allocation 𝐴, a decline in the 
endowment of a country translates one-by-one into a lower contribution of this country to the 
public good provision, and thus causes a fall in its Moulin sacrifice. Conversely, a larger endow-
ment raises the contribution of a country to the public good and thus its Moulin sacrifice. This 
way, the distribution of the Moulin sacrifices becomes more homogenous as long as their ranking 
is preserved, which stabilises the Pareto-optimal allocation 𝐴. 
 
4. A Cobb-Douglas Example 
To illustrate our results, we now consider the special case in which the Cobb-Douglas utility func-
tion 𝑢𝑖(𝑥𝑖, 𝐺) = 𝑥𝑖𝐺
𝛼𝑖  represents the preferences of any country 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛.  Countries may dif-
fer in both their income 𝑦𝑖  and their preference parameter 𝛼𝑖 so that this example enables us to 
highlight the importance of asymmetries across countries for international cooperation. A higher 
value of 𝛼𝑖 indicates a stronger preference for the public good, since the marginal rate of substi-
tution 𝑚𝑟𝑠𝑖(𝑥𝑖
𝐴, 𝐺𝐴) = 𝛼𝑖𝑥𝑖 𝐺⁄  between the public and the private good (and thus the marginal 
utility of the public good in relation to that of the private good) increases with 𝛼𝑖 at any point 
(𝑥𝑖
𝐴, 𝐺). 
 In the Cobb-Douglas case, the egalitarian-equivalent level of public good supply is given by 
?̅?𝑖
𝐴 = (𝑥𝑖
𝐴 𝑦𝑖⁄ )
1/𝛼𝑖𝐺𝐴. Using Definition 2, the Moulin sacrifice of country 𝑖 then becomes  
 
 
(6)                    𝑠𝑖
𝐴 = [1 − (
 𝑥𝑖
𝐴
𝑦𝑖
)
1
𝛼𝑖
] 𝐺𝐴. 
 
This formula reveals that, in an equal-Moulin-sacrifice solution 𝐸 = (𝑥𝑖
𝐸)𝑖∈𝑁, the condition 
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(7)                    
 𝑥𝑖
𝐸
𝑦𝑖
= 𝛾𝛼𝑖 
 
is satisfied for some constant 𝛾 < 1 for all countries. 
 Condition (7) characterises a fair burden sharing agreement according to the Moulin criterion. 
First of all, it implies that each country contributes to the public good provision, i.e. complete 
free-riding is not possible, since 𝛾 < 1 implies that private consumption of each country falls 
short of its income, i.e.  𝑥𝑖
𝐸 < 𝑦𝑖.   
       For a further interpretation of (7), we initially assume that the Cobb-Douglas preferences are 
identical for all countries, i.e. that all 𝛼’s take the same value so that the CEP assumption is satis-
fied. Then it directly follows from (7) that each country pays the same proportion of its national 
income for the public good in the EMS solution. As in the theory of fair taxation, such a cost shar-
ing arrangement can be interpreted as a special version of the ability-to-pay principle. In particu-
lar, it implies that rich countries contribute more in absolute terms to the public good than poor 
countries. 
If the preferences of the countries, however, differ in the parameter 𝛼𝑖, then the country 
with a stronger preference for the public good will spend a higher share of its income for the 
public good than a country with a weaker preference. This cost sharing according to preference 
intensity follows from condition (7), since 𝛾𝛼𝑖  is a decreasing function of 𝛼𝑖 for 𝛾 < 1, and clearly 
reflects the benefit principle. 
 For a further discussion of the Cobb-Douglas example, let the production technology of the 
public good be linear, with 𝐶(𝐺) = 𝐺. As a first step, we consider the two-country case in which 
the preferences of both countries are identical with 𝛼1 = 𝛼2 = 1, but their incomes may differ 
with 𝑦1 + 𝑦2 = 1. Then the lower (upper) contour of the core set is given by  𝑥1
𝐴 = (1 2⁄ ) 𝑦1
2 
( 𝑥1
𝐴 = 𝑦1 − (1 2⁄ ) 𝑦1
2), which describes the consumption bundles that leave country 1 (country 
2) indifferent between staying in the coalition, which gives utility  𝑥𝑖
𝐴/2, and choosing the 
standalone allocation, which gives utility  𝑦𝑖
2/4. The lower and upper contours meet in the origin 
O and point 𝑀 = (1, 1 2⁄ ) and enclose the core lens, as the solid lines in Figure 3 illustrate. The 
higher the income of a country, the higher its consumption needs to be to keep the country in 
the coalition, so that the lower and higher contours are upward sloping. 
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 The Moulin sacrifices of the two countries will be equalised if 𝑥1 = (1 2⁄ )𝑦1. This condition 
yields the straight equal-Moulin-sacrifice (EMS) line from the origin O to point M, along which the 
Moulin sacrifices of both countries are 𝑠𝐸, and which lies within the core lens. Below (above) the 
EMS line, the Moulin sacrifice of country 1 is larger (smaller) than that of country 2. If the Moulin 
sacrifices of country 𝑖 is below (above) the threshold level (1 2⁄ )[1 − (𝑦𝑖 2⁄ )], the corresponding 
allocation will be sufficiently close to (far from) the EMS line, and will thus lie inside (outside) the 
core lens. This confirms Proposition 2 and, as the CEP assumption holds for identical Cobb-
Douglas preferences, also Proposition 3. Figure 2 additionally illustrates Proposition 4: Consider 
the allocation indicated by the dot in the core lens. Any horizontal shift of this dot towards (but 
not beyond) the EMS line captures a redistribution of endowment such that the new allocation is 
also in the core. 
 In a second step, we now consider the case of asymmetric preferences and assume that 
𝛼1 = 1 and 𝛼2 = 1/8 , i.e. that country 2 now has much weaker preferences for the public good 
than country 1. In Figure 3, the broken lines depict the core lens and the EMS line for this case. 
(Details of the calculation can be obtained from the authors on request.) 
 The location of these lines is very intuitive. Compared to the case with symmetric preferences, 
the core lens shrinks for two reasons:  First, the minimum consumption level that is required to 
keep country 1 in the coalition has to increase to compensate country 1 for the smaller level of 
the coalition’s public good provision, which is caused by country 2’s weaker preferences for the 
public good. This explains the upward shift of the lower contour of the core lens. Second, country 
2 requires a higher minimum level of private consumption in the cooperative solution, as its 
Figure 3: The core in the case of 
Cobb-Douglas preferences 
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weaker preferences for the public good entail that it finds contributing to the public good less 
attractive. This explains the downward shift of the upper contour line. 
 The EMS line also moves downwards, as depicted by the broken line below the straight OM 
line. Since country 1 has now stronger preferences for the public good than country 2, country 1 
needs to contribute more than a proportional share of its income to the public good to ensure 
that the Moulin sacrifice is the same for the two countries. Obviously, the EMS line is again in the 
core, as Proposition 2 implies, and thus meets the other lines in points O and M. 
     Finally, we introduce a third country and assume that 𝛼1 = 1, 𝛼2 = 𝛼3 = 1/8, 𝑦1 = 𝑦2 = 2/5 
and 𝑦3 = 1/5. That is, country 1 and country 2 are equally rich but country 2 has weaker prefer-
ences for the public good than country 1, while country 3 is poorer than the other countries and 
has the same weak preferences for the public good as country 2. To further illustrate the rela-
tionship between blocking coalitions and the size of the Moulin sacrifices, we specifically consider 
the Pareto-optimal allocation 𝐴 in which all countries contribute the same share of their initial 
endowment to the public good. Such a proportional funding leads to 𝐴 = (𝑥1
𝐴, 𝑥2
𝐴, 𝑥3
𝐴) =
(16/59, 16/59, 8/59) and 𝐺𝐴 = 19/59. As a short calculation shows, country 2 enjoys a higher 
utility level with its standalone allocation 𝑥2
𝐵({2})
=16/45 and 𝐺𝐵({2}) = 2/45 and can thus block 
the Pareto-optimal allocation 𝐴. Proposition 1 states that, under these circumstances, all coun-
tries whose Moulin sacrifices exceed some threshold level are also able to block the initial alloca-
tion 𝐴. Using the definition given in the proof of Proposition 1, this critical threshold is 
?̆? = 𝐺𝐴 − 𝐺𝐵({2}) = 19/59 − 2/45 = 0.278. In allocation 𝐴, the Moulin sacrifice of both country 
2 and country 3 is 0.308 and thus exceeds this critical value, while that of country 1 is only 0.104. 
Consequently, the sub-coalition consisting of countries 2 and 3 is also able to block the allocation 
𝐴, e.g. by choosing the allocation 𝐵({2,3}) = (𝑥2
𝐵({2,3}), 𝑥3
𝐵({2,3})) = (16 45⁄ , 8/45) with 
𝐺𝐵({2,3}) = 3/45. 
     This example also gives some clues about successful coalition formation strategies. While 
countries 2 and 3 can jointly block the initial Pareto-efficient allocation, only country 2 can do so 
on its own. To prevent a blocking coalition, it is sufficient that country 1 ‘bribes’ country 2, offer-
ing, for instance, a ‘discount’ on country 2’s contributions to the public good. In this way, country 
1 cannot only prevent country 2 from blocking a Pareto-efficient allocation on its own, but also 
from joining forces with country 3. Thus, country 1 can stabilise the grand coalition by making 
concessions to country 2 only, and without compromising with country 3 (but not vice versa). 
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5. Discussion 
5.1 Political Relevance and Implications 
The core property of a public good allocation as defined above rests on a simple assumption on 
the behaviour of countries outside a blocking coalition. We suppose that the public good contri-
butions of the countries left behind are zero, which, from the perspective of the coalition, is the 
worst possible response of the countries outside the coalition. Making this behavioural assump-
tion, our notion of the core property corresponds to both the 𝛼-core concept and 𝛽-core con-
cept. 
 More realistic, however, is the assumption that the countries outside the coalition exhibit 
Nash behaviour and independently choose their best responses to the public good contributions 
of the coalition. This alternative assumption leads us to the concept of the 𝛾-core as suggested by 
Chander and Tulkens (1995, 1997). But if public good supply of the deviating coalition is large 
enough, the optimal response of the outsiders will be a contribution of zero to the public good. 
Hence, all three core concepts coincide in this case. 
 The incentive for a coalition to break off would be stronger if the public good contributions of 
the outsiders were positive instead of zero (see, e.g., Kolm, 2006, for a further discussion of this 
issue). Thus, in our framework, any Pareto-optimal allocation that is not in the 𝛼-core or the 𝛽-
core can never be in the 𝛾-core. If―due to an unequal burden sharing according to the Moulin 
sacrifices―an allocation does not satisfy the core criterion of Definition 1, the cooperative ar-
rangement will not be stable according to all three core concepts. This relationship links the anal-
ysis in our paper to the 𝛾-core and thus further motivates “the relevance of the core to political 
reality” (Foley, 1970, p. 72). 
 From a practical perspective, our analysis suggests some rule-of-the-thumb criteria for suc-
cessful global cooperation in the spirit of a “common but differentiated responsibility.” Funda-
mentally, success in international cooperation requires a burden sharing such that the Moulin 
sacrifices are fairly equal across countries. In this sense, there is a common responsibility. How-
ever, similar Moulin sacrifices can imply very different levels of contribution to a public good. In 
this sense, there is a differentiated responsibility, which reflects the ability-to-pay and the benefit 
principle. 
 For a very rough treatment of the policy implications, consider the case of international cli-
mate policy and assume that there are three groups of countries: Group 1 (EU) with high income 
and strong preferences for climate protection; group 2 (USA, Canada, Australia) also with high 
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income but weak preference for the public good; group 3 (Brazil, China and India as big emerging 
economies) with low income and also weak preferences for climate protection.  Under these cir-
cumstances, our results suggest that group 1 should spend more on climate protection than 
group 2, which in turn should spend more than group 3. Otherwise, groups 2 and 3, separately or 
jointly, can block a global climate agreement, since the ability-to-pay-principle (in the case of 
group 3) or the benefit principle (in the case of group 2 and 3) would be violated. Depending on 
the specific preferences, an EMS solution might mean that group 1 contributes more to climate 
protection not only in absolute terms but also expressed as share of income, as the Cobb-Douglas 
example in Section 4 has shown. 
 The simple three-country example in Section 4 hints at how group 1 might prevent groups 2 
and 3 from forming a blocking coalition, even if Moulin sacrifices cannot be equalised across all 
countries. In this case, ‘bribing’ countries such as USA and Canada might not only keep them in a 
grand coalition, but it could also prevent the countries of group 3 from defecting from the grand 
coalition, as group 3 cannot form a blocking coalition on its own. 
 
5.2 Technology 
The results of the previous sections are based on assumption T1; that is, all countries are sup-
posed to operate with the same technology. However, the public good production functions may 
differ widely between countries, since technological capacities and, in the case of climate change, 
meteorological conditions for generating renewable energy vary significantly across the globe. 
These features can be taken into account through an alternative technological assumption. 
 
Technological Assumption T2: Each country 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁 has a country-specific public good production 
function 𝑔𝑖(𝑧𝑖), with 𝑔𝑖(0) = 0, 𝑔𝑖
′(𝑧𝑖) > 0 and 𝑔𝑖
′′(𝑧𝑖) ≥ 0, where 𝑧𝑖 ≥ 0 is the amount of the 
numeraire good that is used for public good provision in country 𝑖.   
 
 Under assumption T2, an allocation (𝑥𝑖
𝐴)𝑖∈𝑁 with public good supply 𝐺
𝐴 is then feasible if 
𝐺𝐴 = ∑ 𝑔(𝑧𝑖
𝐴)𝑛𝑖=1  and ∑ (𝑥𝑖
𝐴 + 𝑧𝑖
𝐴)𝑛𝑖=1 = 𝑌. The total costs of public good provision in terms of 
private consumption now depends on which country produces how much of the public good.  
 In the scenario with T2, we assume that a coalition 𝐾 ⊆ 𝑁 minimises its total expenditure 
necessary to produce some amount 𝐺 of the public good. That is, for any public good level 𝐺, the 
group of cooperating countries solves the optimisation problem min ∑ 𝑧𝑖𝑖∈𝐾  w.r.t ∑ 𝑔(𝑧𝑖)𝑖∈𝐾 =
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𝐺, which gives a coalition-specific cost function 𝐶𝐾(𝐺). The implementation of the optimal pro-
duction plan may be accompanied by income transfers between the coalition members so that 𝑧𝑖 
may become different from 𝑦𝑖 − 𝑥𝑖 for countries 𝑖 ∈ 𝐾. However, no transfers can take place 
between the non-cooperating outsiders, i.e. 𝑧𝑖 = 𝑦𝑖 − 𝑥𝑖 ≥ 0 holds for all 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁/𝐾. As we sketch 
now, our key messages will remain intact, although with some slight modifications, if we replace 
assumption T1 with T2. 
 The results of the Lemma continue to hold since, given some subgroup 𝐾, we can simply sub-
stitute the group-specific cost function 𝐶𝐾 for 𝐶(𝐾). Also, Proposition 1 remains valid if we im-
pose the additional constraint that no member of the blocking coalition can have a private con-
sumption level above its income in the blocking allocation.6 Without the additional constraint 
𝑥𝑖
𝐵(𝐾)
≤ 𝑦𝑖  for all 𝑖 ∈ 𝐾, a successful blocking coalition might also include countries with low 
Moulin sacrifices in the original allocation. Such a situation can only occur if these countries re-
ceive a net transfer from the other coalition members. Intuitively, these countries with low Mou-
lin sacrifices must be highly productive in providing the public good and can thus produce the 
public good at a lower cost than the other coalition members. In this case, the other coalition 
members face incentives to ‘bribe’ the high-productivity countries to participate in a blocking 
coalition in order to reduce the overall costs of the public good provision. These cost savings 
more than compensate the other coalition members for financing the transfers. 
  However, we can show that in this case it is still a subgroup with high Moulin sacrifices which 
has an incentive to initiate a blocking coalition by making ‘bribing’ payments. In this sense, the 
spirit of our conclusion remains intact. The same is true for Proposition 4. As this proposition 
makes use of Proposition 1, Proposition 4 remains valid under the same additional restrictions as 
Proposition 1. In this context, note that small income transfers do not affect the cost function 
𝐶𝐾(𝐺) for any subgroup 𝐾 ⊆ 𝑁. Finally, Proposition 2 still holds under assumption T2 without 
any further qualifications.  
 
6. Conclusion 
The main purpose of this paper is to establish a link between the stability of cooperation (and 
thus the possibility to attain an efficient solution) and the equity of burden sharing. Using the 
concepts of core stability and Moulin sacrifices, we have shown that if a Pareto-optimal alloca-
                                                 
6
 With this modification, the second inequality of relationship (A-1) in the proof of Proposition 1 becomes redundant, 
as 𝐾 ⊆ 𝐾′. After the last inequality in (A-1), we have to set 𝐶𝐾(𝐺
𝐵(𝐾)) ≥ 𝐶𝐾′(𝐺
𝐵(𝐾)), which is trivially satisfied. 
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tion lies outside the core, it will be rejected by the group of countries with the highest Moulin 
sacrifices. These ‘overburdened’ countries face a particularly strong incentive to break off and 
standalone, which gives a novel equity based interpretation for the core property. 
     The relevance of a balanced distribution of Moulin sacrifices for core stability is also highlight-
ed by the fact that a fairly equalised distribution of Moulin sacrifices ensures that the Pareto-
optimal allocation is in the core. Thus, a grand coalition can be maintained if the members are 
treated equally according to their Moulin sacrifice. This provides some guidelines for the design 
of an agreement that aims at full cooperation and a Pareto-optimal allocation. For instance, eve-
rything else equal, a richer country should contribute more to the public good than a poorer 
country, reflecting the ability-to-pay principle. Also, a country with weak preferences for the pub-
lic good might only need to bear a small share of the costs of public good provision, possibly even 
if it is quite rich. This reflects the benefit principle. 
     As the Moulin sacrifice is a utility-based measure of burden, this notion of equity is different 
from many other concepts that are discussed in the context of international environmental nego-
tiations on climate change, such as the concept that all countries should carry out the same rela-
tive reduction of emissions (see, e.g., Bretschger, 2013). Such non-utility based concepts of equi-
ty, however, ignore preference intensities, which are in general a crucial determinant of the be-
haviour of individuals and governments. Thus, they only provide a distorted picture of the wel-
fare implications of different allocations and might not be particularly useful for achieving a suc-
cessful cooperation. 
     Finally, the link between the core concept and the Moulin sacrifice provides an additional 
normative motivation for the core concept, particularly as the Moulin sacrifice incorporates both 
the ability-to-pay and the benefit principle. In this way, we have continued the long-standing dis-
cussion in public economics about the relationship between the stability of cooperation and the 
basic principles of fair burden sharing (see already Wicksell, 1896). In the current debate on cli-
mate policy, the benefit principle―unlike the ability-to-pay principle―only plays a minor role. 
Subsequent research on the public choice aspects of climate policy might explain this neglect 
and, simultaneously, show whether this may also account for the limited success of climate nego-
tiations. 
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Appendix 
 
A 1: Proof of the Lemma 
(i) If: From inequality (5) in the main text, we get 𝑑 ≔ ∑ (𝑦𝑖 − ℎ𝑖
𝐴(?̃?))𝑖∈𝐾 − 𝐶(?̃?) > 0. Thus, the 
allocation 𝐵(𝐾) defined by 𝐺𝐵(𝐾) = ?̃? and 𝑥𝑖
𝐵(𝐾)
= ℎ𝑖
𝐵(𝐾)
(?̃?) + (𝑑 𝑘⁄ ) for all 𝑖 ∈ 𝐾 is feasible for 
subgroup 𝐾, since it fulfils condition (1) of the main text. Clearly, 𝐵(𝐾) blocks the initial alloca-
tion 𝐴, since all countries in subgroup 𝐾 are strictly better off in 𝐵(𝐾) than in allocation 𝐴. Be-
cause public good supply 𝐺𝐵(𝐾) in a blocking allocation being constructed in this way can be cho-
sen as any ?̃? which satisfies (5), this also shows the last part of the Lemma. 
(ii) Only if: If 𝐾 can block allocation 𝐴 by choosing the allocation 𝐵(𝐾) with public good supply 
𝐺𝐵(𝐾), then condition (2) directly gives ℎ𝑖
𝐴(𝐺𝐵(𝐾)) < 𝑥𝑖
𝐵(𝐾)
 for all 𝑖 ∈ 𝐾. From equation (1) in the 
main text, it thus follows that condition (5) is fulfilled for ?̃? = 𝐺𝐵(𝐾). But if this is the case for 
some ?̃?, there even is a ?̃? < 𝐺𝐴 for which inequality (5) also holds. To show this, we start from 
the Samuelson condition for the Pareto-optimal allocation 𝐴, which reads as 
∑ [𝜕ℎ𝑖
𝐴(𝐺𝐴) 𝜕𝐺⁄ ]𝑛𝑖=1 + 𝐶
′(𝐺𝐴) = 0. (Since 𝑚𝑟𝑠𝑖(ℎ𝑖
𝐴(𝐺𝐴), 𝐺𝐴) = − 𝜕ℎ𝑖
𝐴(𝐺𝐴) 𝜕𝐺⁄ , this formula-
tion of the Samuelson condition is equivalent to that stated at the beginning of Section 2.2.)  As 
𝜕ℎ𝑖
𝐴 𝜕𝐺⁄ < 0 especially for all 𝑖 ∉ 𝐾, we get 𝜕𝑌𝐾
𝐴(𝐺𝐴) 𝜕𝐺⁄ = ∑ [𝜕ℎ𝑖
𝐴(𝐺𝐴) 𝜕𝐺⁄ ]𝑖∈𝐾 + 𝐶
′(𝐺𝐴) > 0. 
Convexity of indifference curves and 𝐶′′(𝐺) ≥ 0 furthermore imply that 𝜕𝑌𝐾
𝐴(𝐺) 𝜕𝐺⁄ > 0 holds 
also for all 𝐺 ≥ 𝐺𝐴, and thus that 𝑌𝐾
𝐴(𝐺) > 𝑌𝐾
𝐴(𝐺𝐴) for all 𝐺 > 𝐺𝐴. Combined with continuity of 
the function 𝑌𝐾
𝐴(𝐺), this entails that condition (5) can be satisfied for some ?̃? < 𝐺
𝐴 as soon as it 
can be satisfied at all. 
 
A 2: Proof of Proposition 1 
If some coalition 𝐾 can block a given allocation 𝐴, the Lemma gives that 𝐺𝐵(𝐾) < 𝐺𝐴 can be as-
sumed for the public good supply 𝐺𝐵(𝐾) in the blocking allocation. We can then show that the 
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coalition defined by 𝐾′ ≔ {𝑖 ∈ 𝑁: 𝐺𝐵(𝐾) ≥ ?̅?𝑖
𝐴} is also able to block  allocation 𝐴. As indifference 
curves are downward sloping, we clearly have 𝐾′ ≔ {𝑖 ∈ 𝑁: ℎ𝑖
𝐴(𝐺𝐵(𝐾)) ≤ 𝑦𝑖},  which implies the 
following relations: 
 
(A-1)          ∑ [𝑦𝑖 − ℎ𝑖
𝐴(𝐺𝐵(𝐾))]
𝑖∈𝐾′
≥ ∑ [𝑦𝑖 − ℎ𝑖
𝐴(𝐺𝐵(𝐾))]
𝑖∈𝐾′∩𝐾
≥ ∑[𝑦𝑖 − ℎ𝑖
𝐴(𝐺𝐵(𝐾))]
𝑖∈𝐾
> 𝐶(𝐺𝐵(𝐾)). 
 
The first inequality in (A-1) is satisfied, since 𝑦𝑖 − ℎ𝑖
𝐴(𝐺𝐵(𝐾)) ≥ 0 for all 𝑖 ∈ 𝐾′ follows from the 
definition of 𝐾′, and since, clearly, 𝐾′ ∩ 𝐾 ⊆ 𝐾′. The second inequality is obtained because, for all 
countries 𝑖 that are in 𝐾 but not in 𝐾′, we have 𝑦𝑖 − ℎ𝑖
𝐴(𝐺𝐵(𝐾)) < 0. The third inequality is im-
plied by the ‘only-if’ part of the Lemma. The ‘if-part’ of the Lemma then shows that the coalition 
𝐾′ is also able to block allocation 𝐴. Finally, we define ?̆? ≔ 𝐺𝐴 − 𝐺𝐵(𝐾) > 0, implying that 
?̆? = {𝑖 ∈ 𝑁: 𝑠𝑖
𝐴 ≥ ?̆?} = 𝐾′. Thus, the requested threshold level for the Moulin sacrifices is given 
by ?̆?. 
 
A 3: Proof of Proposition 2 
We first show that, for any subgroup 𝐾, there exists an 𝜀(𝐾) > 0 such that all Pareto-optimal 
allocations 𝐴 which imply 𝑠𝑖
𝐴 ∈ [𝑠𝐸 − 𝜀(𝐾), 𝑠𝐸 + 𝜀(𝐾)] cannot be blocked by coalition 𝐾. Other-
wise, there would exist a sequence (𝐴𝑗)𝑗∈ℕ of Pareto-optimal allocations (and corresponding 
sequences of Moulin sacrifices (𝑠𝑖
𝐴𝑗)𝑗∈ℕ and utility levels (𝑢𝑖
𝐴𝑗)𝑗∈ℕ with lim𝑗→∞ 𝑠𝑖
𝐴𝑗 = 𝑠𝐸 and 
lim𝑗→∞ 𝑢𝑖
𝐴𝑗 = 𝑢𝐸 for each 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛) such that, for all  𝑗 ∈ ℕ, coalition 𝐾 could block allocation 
𝐴𝑗 = (𝑥𝑖
𝐴𝑗)𝑗∈ℕ. Then the Lemma implies that ?̂?𝐾
𝐴𝑗 < 𝑌𝐾 for all 𝑗 ∈ ℕ. As lim𝑗→∞ 𝑢𝑖
𝐴𝑗 = 𝑢𝐸, this 
gives ?̂?𝐾
𝐸 = lim𝑗→∞ ?̂?𝐾
𝐴𝑗 ≤ 𝑌𝐾, which―again according to the Lemma―means that coalition 𝐾 
could attain the same utility levels for all its members by standing alone and choosing a blocking 
allocation with public good supply 𝐺𝐵(𝐾). Since, trivially, 𝐺𝐵(𝐾) > 𝐺𝐸 − 𝑠𝐸, the allocation in which 
the coalition 𝐾 chooses 𝐵(𝐾) and all countries 𝑖 ∉ 𝐾 enjoy private consumption 𝑦𝑖 is feasible 
and―as ℎ𝑖
𝐴(𝐺𝐵(𝐾)) < 𝑦𝑖 for all 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛―would entail a Pareto-improvement over 𝐸. This, 
however, contradicts the Pareto-optimality of 𝐸. Thus, a sequence  (𝐴𝑗)𝑗∈ℕ of blockable alloca-
tions converging to 𝐸 cannot exist, implying that a critical value 𝜀(𝐾) > 0 with the required 
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property exists for any coalition 𝐾. Taking the minimum of all 𝜀(𝐾) over the finitely many sub-
groups of 𝑁 then completes the proof.  
 
A 4: Proof of Proposition 3 
Given some coalition 𝐾, let 𝑠(𝐾) = 𝑠𝐸 + (?̅?𝐸 − ?̅?𝐸(𝐾)) be the threshold level for Moulin sacrific-
es, where ?̅?𝐸 and ?̅?𝐸(𝐾) are the egalitarian-equivalent public good supply levels for the EMS 𝐸 of 
all countries and for the standalone equal Moulin sacrifice solution 𝐸(𝐾) of group 𝐾, respective-
ly. Now consider any allocation 𝐴 for which 𝑠𝑖
𝐴 > 𝑠(𝐾) holds for each country 𝑖 ∈ 𝐾. Then we 
have  
 
(A-2) ?̅?𝑖
𝐴 = 𝐺𝐴 − 𝑠𝑖
𝐴 < 𝐺𝐴 − [𝑠𝐸 + (?̅?𝐸 − ?̅?𝐸(𝐾))] = 𝐺𝐴 − [𝐺𝐸 − ?̅?𝐸 + (?̅?𝐸 − ?̅?𝐸(𝐾))] = ?̅?𝐸(𝐾). 
 
In (A-2), the first equality sign and the second one follow from the definition of the Moulin sacri-
fices, the inequality sign from the assumption 𝑠𝑖
𝐴 > 𝑠(𝐾) and the definition of 𝑠(𝐾), and the last 
equality sign from 𝐺𝐴 = 𝐺𝐸  because, with CEP preferences, public good supply is the same in all 
Pareto-optimal allocation. From ?̅?𝑖
𝐴 < ?̅?𝐸(𝐾), which is established by (A-2), it follows that 
𝑢𝑖(𝑥𝑖
𝐸(𝐾), 𝐺𝐸(𝐾)) = 𝑢𝑖(𝑦𝑖, ?̅?
𝐸(𝐾)) > 𝑢𝑖(𝑦𝑖, ?̅?
𝐴) = 𝑢𝑖(𝑥𝑖
𝐴, 𝐺𝐴) for every 𝑖 ∈ 𝐾 so that all members 
of coalition 𝐾 attain a higher utility in their standalone allocation 𝐸(𝐾) than in the allocation 𝐴. 
Therefore, coalition 𝐾 is able to block allocation 𝐴. 
 Finally, ?̅?𝐸(𝐾) < ?̅?𝐸 and thus the inequality 𝑠(𝐾) > 𝑠𝐸 hold, since otherwise the feasible allo-
cation, in which private consumption is 𝑥𝑖
𝐸(𝐾)
 for all 𝑖 ∈ 𝐾 and 𝑦𝑖 for all 𝑖 ∉ 𝐾 and public good 
supply is 𝐺𝐸(𝐾), would Pareto-dominate allocation 𝐸, which is a contradiction to the Pareto-
optimality of 𝐸. 
 
A 5: Proof of Proposition 4  
We rank countries in descending order of their Moulin sacrifices, i.e. 𝑠1
𝐴 ≥ ⋯ ≥ 𝑠𝑛
𝐴. Then initial 
endowment is shifted from some country 𝑗 to another country 𝑙 > 𝑗 such that the Moulin sacri-
fice of country 𝑗 decreases and that of country 𝑙 increases while the ranking of the sacrifice levels 
is preserved. Given the technological assumption T1, the allocation 𝐴 remains feasible after such 
a redistribution of the initial endowment, since all private consumption levels are kept constant. 
For any 𝑘 = 1, … , 𝑛, now let total income of subgroup 𝐾(𝑘) = {1, … , 𝑘} be denoted by 𝑌𝑘 before 
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and by ?̃?𝑘 after the transfer. Obviously, ?̃?𝑘 = 𝑌𝑘 holds for all 𝑘 < 𝑗 and all 𝑘 ≥ 𝑙, and ?̃?𝑘 < 𝑌𝑘 for 
all 𝑘 with 𝑗 ≤ 𝑘 < 𝑙. The Lemma then implies that no coalition 𝐾(𝑘) is able to block the original 
allocation 𝐴 after the change if no coalition 𝐾(𝑘) could do so under the initial income distribu-
tion. Proposition 1, however, says that some of these coalitions 𝐾(𝑘) (with the relatively highest 
Moulin sacrifices) should have been able to block 𝐴 if this allocation can be blocked at all. This 
shows that allocation 𝐴 remains in the core after the income redistribution. 
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